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I
n the August 2001 “Process Maturity
Profile of the Software Community
2001 Mid-Year Update” [1], the Software
Engineering Institute (SEI) reported that
the median time to move from Capability
Maturity Model
® (CMM
®) Level 3 to Level
4 is 33 months, followed by 18 additional
months to reach CMM Level 5.
Obviously, accomplishing the same objec-
tive in six to 12 months is a remarkable
achievement. To do it twice – as two
organizations within The Boeing
Company did – is not only a credit to the
organizations involved, but to the under-
lying principles that were present in both
efforts.
In December 2001, just 12 months
after receiving CMM Level 3, the Boeing
Military Aircraft and Missiles Seattle Site
(AMSS) organization achieved CMM
Level 5. Previously in 1996, the Boeing
Space Transportation Systems (STS)
organization transitioned from CMM
Level 3 to Level 5 in approximately six
months.
It is not a mystery that any successful
improvement effort – regardless of its
timeline – requires sponsorship, practi-
tioners’ involvement, and a focus on the
organization’s business needs. But those
elements by themselves do not necessari-
ly equate to an accelerated timeline, which
begs the question: What additional factors
must be present in an organization in
order to achieve high-maturity in a rela-
tively short amount of time?
Although the Boeing AMSS and STS
achievements
1 were separated by approxi-
mately six years and involved different
personnel, they shared the following three
fundamental elements in their approach
to improvement: software engineering
process group (SEPG) composition, a
strong tie to the business case, and proj-
ects that had institutionalized a data-driv-
en approach to management. The follow-
ing sections will describe each of these
common elements and how they con-
tributed to each organization’s success.
SEPG Composition
Sponsorship is a commonly cited reason
for why improvement efforts succeed or
fail. Both AMSS and STS addressed the
issue of sponsorship by carefully crafting
their SEPG. The first common element
was SEPG leadership.
Senior managers (i.e., a manager of
other managers) or executive managers
(i.e., project managers) were appointed to
chair the SEPG and were allowed time to
do so as a part of their job descriptions.
The STS software engineering manager
chaired the STS SEPG with membership
that included all project software man-
agers, key leads, key domain experts, and
process focal points. For the AMSS
SEPG, an executive manager was
appointed chairperson, with membership
that included the chief software engineers
from each project, domain experts, and
process focal points. In both cases, man-
agers accounted for 33 percent to 50 per-
cent of total SEPG membership.
In addition, AMSS had a steering
committee that included program execu-
tives and business unit functional man-
agers. The steering committee’s role was
to establish AMSS objectives, commit
resources, and monitor the progress of
the AMSS SEPG.
Including senior managers and pro-
gram executives in hands-on roles in the
improvement effort was the first key to
securing project participation. SEPG
leadership activities went beyond declara-
tions of intent, writing policy, and attend-
ing weekly meetings. SEPG leaders and
members had a stake in the outcome of
the improvement efforts because it affect-
ed products they had responsibility for
producing.
Additional benefits included the fol-
lowing:
•T he individuals who were accountable
for producing the overall system set
the process improvement goals, which
aligned improvement efforts with the
product and business needs, not a
model.
•T he individuals who had responsibili-
ty for building the software dictated
what the processes were and how they
should be used. There was a clear rela-
tionship between a process and its
impact on day-to-day work.
•T he managers who had authority over
budgets and personnel resources put
plans into action. As a result, improve-
ment efforts were an integral part of
the mainstream software development
activities rather than activities isolated
from the business concerns.
Improvement efforts were closely tied
to the bottom line; the people making the
decisions were accountable for the prod-
ucts being produced by the processes.
Staffing the SEPG in this way estab-
lished the group with responsibility,
authority, and accountability. Oftentimes,
SEPGs are staffed with individuals who
have the responsibility for managing the
improvement effort but have little or no
actual authority to change behavior, no
personnel or budget authority, and no
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direct accountability for cost, schedule, or
quality. The key factor that separated the
Boeing AMSS and STS organizations was
the insistence that SEPG leaders and
members have a stake in the outcome that
was directly tied to the bottom line of the
projects within the organization.
Another common practice on both
teams was the commitment to charter the
SEPG based on continuous process
improvement, not to simply achieve a
CMM level. Gary Wigle and George
Yamamura described this and other suc-
cessful practices of the STS SEPG in
their 1997 article, “Practices of an SEI
CMM Level 5 SEPG” [2]. The position of
STS was that chartering an SEPG based
on continuous improvement would align
the business case for improvement with
the activities of process definition,
process change management, technology
insertion, process evaluation, training,
process improvement support, and regu-
lar assessments. A SEPG charter based on
the business needs of the organization,
combined with personnel that have the
authority to make changes, were key to
the success of STS.
AMSS adopted a similar philosophy
early on by selecting the STS charter as its
model. This approach to SEPG composi-
tion and function provided the founda-
tion for understanding the business case
for high maturity practices, and assured
that key stakeholders were involved.
This approach has proven successful
on two separate occasions in two com-
pletely different business units. The fact
that the model proved successful in com-
pletely different domains, with different
personnel involved, and with approxi-
mately six years separating the two efforts
underscores the value of chartering and
staffing an SEPG in this manner.
A Strong Tie to the
Business Case
The second key factor was developing an
understanding of what areas were critical
to producing successful, high-quality
products in order to focus improvement
efforts. In the case of STS, the Inertial
Upper Stage (IUS) project had a business
objective to achieve a 100 percent mission
success rate. Over time, they developed a
clear understanding of the relationship
between key development practices and
mission success. Defect prevention was
strongly emphasized long before the
CMM was ever published because soft-
ware errors during flight could rapidly
lead to mission failure.
For AMSS, the Boeing F-22 project
had established a history of outstanding
product quality, cost, and schedule per-
formance. Maintaining a careful balance
of cost, schedule, and quality perform-
ance while reducing cycle time has
become a primary business objective.
Before either organization made an effort
to achieve Level 5, the underlying busi-
ness goals and criteria for success were
established and communicated to every-
one in the organization. Consequently,
processes and metrics were inherently
aligned to provide the necessary insight
into critical processes and product quality.
As an example, the former Military
Aircraft and Missiles Business Unit used
five balanced measures in the areas of
cost, schedule, quality, cycle time, and
inventory/backlog. Four of these five
were deemed relevant to software and
flowed down to the AMSS organization
(cost, schedule, quality, and cycle time). At
the project level, data supporting these
four areas had already been collected and
used for a number of years. The data were
researched and analyzed to establish his-
torical baseline capabilities for process
and quality. This established a quantifiable
understanding at the project and organi-
zation levels in areas that were already tied
to the business case of the organization
and the business unit. This also provided
a commonality among metrics in use by
all projects of the organization (see
Figure 1).
In both cases, the pursuit of high
maturity practices was rooted in a quan-
tifiable understanding of the impact
improvement efforts would have on the
bottom line. In fact, the application of the
CMM-based approach had little to do
with the CMM itself; rather, it was the act
of putting these practices into place that
eventually improved the project in terms
of cost, schedule, and quality. Most
importantly, that understanding was
shared with senior managers and execu-
tives who were accountable for mission
success.
Project Culture and
Historical Data
The existence of historical data that had
been consistently collected over several
years was the final contributing factor to
achieving Level 5 in such a short time. In
both cases, the organizations valued a
data-driven approach to software man-
agement; both had used a consistent set
of indicators for a number of years. Each
organization had at least one project (IUS
for STS, and Boeing F-22 for AMSS) that,
through the necessity of meeting business
and mission objectives, had long since ini-
tiated a data-driven approach to software
management.
Making the transition from Level 3 to
Level 5 amounted to taking what the
managers understood as intuition, experi-
ence, and instinct and adding the quanti-
tative understanding as revealed through
analysis of the historical data. Managers
on both IUS and Boeing F-22 had been
making mental quantitative interpreta-
tions of the data for a number of years.
Providing a historical context based on
statistical analysis was a logical extension
to the existing mindset of the software
managers. Deployment was further accel-
erated by the fact that a quantitative
understanding of process and quality was
introduced in areas where data had been
collected and analyzed for a number of
years. While the presentation and usage of
the historical data was new, the practice of
collecting, reporting, and acting on the
data had been long-since established.
For both organizations, introducing a
quantitative understanding of the data in
use was treated as an extension of an
existing practice, not a new practice. Once
this technique was understood and the
benefits quantified, the value of applying
this practice to other areas of software
development became obvious. Each
organization prioritized its efforts based
Business
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Figure 1: Business Case Driven Approach
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on the data that directly tied to its core
business needs. This resulted in a quanti-
tative metric set that included eight to 12
metrics distributed across process and
quality.
Both organizations used metrics relat-
ing to cost and schedule that included
earned value, cost and schedule variance,
budget, actuals, and product release per-
formance. STS used several defect-related
measurements that ranged from defect
removal during peer reviews to defect
profiles (quantity and density) for each
software product with clear traceability to
ongoing defect prevention efforts. AMSS
also used defect density measurements
but with an increased emphasis on cycle
time, and used measurements such as
build cycle time to help manage improve-
ments without sacrificing cost or quality.
Using eight to 12 metrics proved to be
both meaningful and manageable. Some
organizations can fall into the trap of try-
ing to produce more Level 4 metrics than
can possibly be used in an effective man-
ner. In addition, new metrics may get
invented that provide interesting informa-
tion, but have no real significance in
understanding the things that are vital to
running the business. Both AMSS and
STS avoided that trap because of SEPG
composition and the tie to the business
case. The individuals who used the met-
rics dictated what areas were meaningful.
Summary
The combination of hands-on participa-
tion by senior managers and executives, a
clear tie to the business case, and the
availability of mature historical data all
contributed to making a rapid and almost
intuitive transition to the high maturity
practices. A common reaction from
achieving Level 5 by both STS and AMSS
was that it validated long-standing busi-
ness practices that had been refined and
elevated as best practices. Instead of hav-
ing to overcome the not-invented-here
syndrome, members of each organization
were proud to say these processes were
invented here.◆
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